Everything HuShield does

A Call Directory extension blocks known-bad numbers outright and labels suspected ones, driven entirely by the locally-synced list.

REQ-08

An SMS Filter extension classifies incoming messages with no network access at all. Filtering must work in airplane mode.

REQ-09

Report spam or not-spam, look up a number, and contribute a community caller-ID name.

REQ-10

One framework handles App Attest enrolment, token refresh, and blocklist delta sync, shared across the app and both extensions via an App Group.

REQ-11

Block on the live community score at the moment a call arrives, instead of waiting for the next blocklist sync. Uses Apple's privacy-preserving encrypted lookup, so the server never learns which number was queried.

Claim issue #20 →

The Status tab says "Not enrolled yet" without an obvious way to fix it — enrolment happens as a side effect of the first sync. It should be something you can just do.

Claim issue #14 →

Silence callers who aren't in your contacts, but let numbers the community has vouched for ring through anyway — so you don't lose the pharmacy and the school along with the spam.

Claim issue #13 →

Any attested device can report a number as spam or not-spam. A device's identity is an Apple App Attest key and nothing else — no account, no phone number, no contact upload.

REQ-01

Each report contributes trust_weight × category_multiplier × exponential_decay(age, 30-day half-life). Not-spam votes subtract. Crossing 2.0 labels a number; 5.0 blocks it. An admin override always wins.

REQ-02

A device's vote weight is a pure function of its reporting tenure, volume, and how often its votes disagreed with the eventual community outcome. This is what makes brigading expensive.

REQ-02

Keyset pagination, neighbour-spoof widening, crowd-sourced caller ID, and removal tombstones so a number that stops being blockable is explicitly un-blocked on clients rather than silently vanishing from the feed.

REQ-03

Imports FTC and FCC public complaint datasets via synthetic seed devices, so the blocklist is useful before the first real user arrives.

REQ-04

attest → verify → assert-refresh, with strictly-increasing counter replay protection. Tokens refresh without re-attesting.

REQ-05

Look up the current reputation of a single number without pulling the whole blocklist.

REQ-06

Server-initiated APNs silent pushes nudge clients to resync so a newly-blocked number reaches devices without waiting for the next poll.

REQ-07

Silent refresh pushes currently go to every device after every recompute, whether or not that device's blocklist changed. Targeting the ones actually affected saves everyone else's battery.

Claim issue #18 →

Apple App Attest verified end to end against production from a physical iPhone — confirmed by the Apple-issued attestation receipt stored server-side, with fabricated attestations correctly rejected.

REQ-05

Real App Attest validated on physical hardware, a shared challenge store for multi-instance deploys, and scheduled score recomputation.

REQ-12

Builds for linux/amd64 and linux/arm64, with GOARCH derived from the build target so a cross-build cannot silently produce a binary for the wrong architecture. The compose stack passes the full smoke lifecycle.

17 checks against the live deployment, run automatically after every deploy. Proves negatives too: a forged attestation must be rejected, so a server accidentally left in mock mode fails the gate.

134 iOS tests run only on a maintainer's laptop, so an iOS pull request can't be verified before a human builds it. Needs a macOS runner and a durable fix for Xcode/simulator-runtime mismatches.

Claim issue #17 →

There is no CI. The test gate lives in a local Makefile, which means a contributor cannot see their PR pass before a maintainer runs it by hand.